# Frame latency evaluation: when simulation and analysis alone are not enough

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### Outlook

- 1. Context: early design phases where only simulation and analysis are available
- 2. Goal: see how simulation and analysis compare and point out their pitfalls
- 3. Method: insight from experiments on Controller Area Network







### Why timing verification is required











- Verify that performance requirements are met: deadlines, jitters, throughput
- Select the hardware / software components: optimize costs
- Meet some certification level:
   e.g., avionics, railway systems, power plants, etc

Timing models: trade-off to be found between accuracy / complexity / computing time





## RTaW mission: help designers build truly safe and optimized systems

- Activities: Model-Based Design, dependability, formal and temporal verification
- Communications systems: CAN, AFDX, FlexRay, SpaceWire, industrial Ethernet, TTP, etc...
- Verification techniques: schedulability analysis, network-calculus, model-checking and simulation
- Domains: aerospace, automotive and industry at large

In our experience, 2 cases for timing verification:

- ✓ Certification is mandatory (e.g., DO178B DAL A): well accepted
- ✓ No certification: various practices / levels of acceptance







# Type A: no timing validation whatsoever (early in the V-cycle)

Practice: Carry-over of existing (proven in use) systems with domain-specific rules:

"The load on an automotive CAN network must not be higher than 30%"

"A frame pending for transmission for more than 30ms is cancelled out"

etc...

- ✓ Sub-optimal design : e.g., does one really need 5 (or more) distinct CAN buses in a car?!
- ✓ Potentially unsafe design with problems that are hard to reproduce and are costly to repair later ...







## Type B: simulation is enough, worst-case never occurs anyway!

Practice: software simulations, then simulations with HiL (Hardware in the Loop) as the ECUs become available ...

- √ Hardware resources (too?) well optimized
- ✓ Unsafe results because the worst-case sometimes occurs (and may even last for a long time, see preliminary results later in the presentation)

A question that remain mainly open in timing verification:

"How often does the worst-case actually occur?"

First, get some insight with experimentations ...







## Type C: analysis says the system is safe, so we are covered ...

Practice: use some black-box software that implements worst-case timing analysis and concludes about the feasibility of the system

- ✓ Sub-optimal design sometimes because overestimations / pessimistic assumptions add up
- ✓ Potentially unsafe design:
  - software are error-prone,
  - not everything is accurately modeled
  - analytic models especially unpublished complex ones can be wrong








### Experimental setup








# CAN communication stack a simplified view



### Requirements on temporal verification:

- √ handle 150+ frames
- √ ≠ waiting queue policy at the microcontroller level
- ✓ limited number of transmission buffers
- ✓ handle frame offsets





CAN Bus








### Scheduling frames with offsets ?!

**Principle:** desynchronize transmissions to avoid load peaks



Algorithms to decide offsets are based on arithmetical properties of the periods and size of the frame








### Network configuration


Network	Controller Area Network 125 kbit/s	
Set of messages	Automotive body network generated with NETCARBENCH [8]	
	http://www.netcarbench.org	
# ECUs	15	
# frames	145	
Workload	50.5%	
Periods	[50,2000ms] with distributions from an existing car	
Frame offsets	Optimized with DOA algorithm [3]	
Inter-ECU offsets	All offsets are possible (clock drifts, ECU reboots, ECU boot sequence depends on sleep mode, etc)	
ECU clock drifts	3 cases: no drift, ±1ppm, ±1000ppm	





### RTaW software used in the study





RTaW-Sim: Fine-Grained Simulation of Controller Area Network with Fault-Injection Capabilities

NETCAR-Analyzer: Timing Analysis and Resource Usage Optimization for Controller Area Network (© Inria/Inpl)

RTaW-Sim freely available at <a href="http://www.realtimeatwork.com">http://www.realtimeatwork.com</a> starting from June 2010







# On why we should not trust analytic models for worst-case frame latency evaluation








### Types of results achievable with worstcase analysis


Frame worst-case response times

#### Max buffer utilization

Maximum Buffer Utilization Pha				
	Ecu	Max Buffer	Max BackLog	
•	Ecu_0	2	0	
	Ecu_1	8	6	
	Ecu_2	6	5	
	Ecu_3	4	3	
	Ecu_4	2	1	
	Ecu_5	2	1	
	Ecu_6	2	1	
	Ecu_7	2	1	
	Ecu_8	3	2	
	Ecu_9	2	1	
	Ecu_10	2	1	
	Ecu_11	2	1	
	Ecu_12	1	0	
	Ecu_13	3	2	
	Ecu_14	1	0	
*				














★ LowerBound

non-optimized solution

### Analytic models need to be fine-grained frame offsets overlooked here ...




To the best of our knowledge, there are no (usable) published results on this







# Analytic model needs to be fine grained Frame waiting queue is FIFO on ECU1 the OEM does not know or software cannot handle it ...









# There is a gap between WCRT analytic models and reality IMHO

- Traffic is not always well caracterized and/or well modeled
   e.g. aperiodic traffic ?! see [5] for some solution
- Implementation choices really matter
   and standards do not say everything, eg. Autosar drivers
- Analytic models are often much simplified abstraction of reality
  - optimistic (=unsafe): FIFO queue, hardware limitations such as non-abortable transmissions [4,7], etc
  - overly pessimistic: e.g. overlooking frame offsets, aperiodic traffic modeled as sporadic, etc
- Analytic models are prone to errors
   remember "CAN analysis refuted, revisited, etc" [6] ?!

Bottom line: do not blindly trust analytic models!

Systems should be conceived so as to be analyzable in temporal domain








# On why we should not trust simulation models for worst-case frame latency evaluation







### Are simulation results (max) close to worstcase response times? Well ...










Are simulation results (max) close to worstcase response times? with clock drifts



Whatever you do, you have little chance with simulation to find the worst-case!








### Are simulation results (max) close to worstcase response times? with clock drifts

#### **Simulation Setup:**

 Same as previous slide



Increasing the clock drift rate is not enough ...








# Knowing the analysis results – including here worst-case inter-ECU offsets for each frame - simulation becomes more useful







## Simulation helps validate assumptions made, correctness and tightness of WCRT analysis




Difference comes here from the blocking factor that is not explicitly simulated







# How often does the worst-case occurs: very often on certain trajectories ...










### Distribution of response times for frame 61 with and without clock drifts



Even with clock drift, unusually large response times occur during more than 30mn!







# Conclusion: in the context of dependability constrained systems ...

- Simulation is not enough and analytic models are usually much simplified, often pessimistic and sometimes even wrong
- Simulating the worst-case trajectory (and neighbours):
  - helps to validate analytic models: latencies, buffer occupation, etc.
  - tells us about how long we stay in the worst-case situation
- Our ongoing work: how often does the worst-case actually occur?
   do we really need to dimension for the worst-case for a given a SIL level?
- Application to CAN, AFDX and switched Ethernet in aerospace, power plant and automotive domains








### References








### References





- [1] N. Navet, F. Simonot-Lion, editors, The Automotive Embedded Systems Handbook, Industrial Information Technology series, CRC Press / Taylor and Francis, ISBN 978-0849380266, December 2008.
- [2] RealTime-at-Work (RTaW), A Fine-Grained Simulation of Controller Area Network with Fault-Injection Capabilities, freely available on RTaW web site: http://www.realtimeatwork.com, 2010.
- [3] M. Grenier, J. Goossens, N. Navet, "Near-Optimal Fixed Priority Preemptive Scheduling of Offset Free Systems", Proc. of the 14th International Conference on Network and Systems (RTNS'2006), Poitiers, France, May 30-31, 2006.
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- [6] R. Davis, A. Burn, R. Bril, and J. Lukkien, "Controller Area Network (CAN) schedulability analysis: Refuted, revisited and revised", Real-Time Systems, vol. 35, pp. 239–272, 2007.
- [7] M. D. Natale, "Evaluating message transmission times in Controller Area Networks without buffer preemption", in 8th Brazilian Workshop on Real-Time Systems, 2006.
- [8] C. Braun, L. Havet, N. Navet, "NETCARBENCH: a benchmark for techniques and tools used in the design of automotive communication systems", Proc IFAC FeT 2007, Toulouse, France, November 7-9, 2007.







### Questions / feedback?



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